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WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

UTAH
Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., 133 P.3d 382 (Utah 2006) (holding
that when evaluating an application for change in use of a water right:
(1) district courts enjoy significant, but not broad, discretion, when
determining whether evidence of impairment is sufficient for application denial; (2) the applicant seeking change need only show reason to
believe that approval of the proposal will not impair vested water
rights; (3) the applicant bears the burden of persuasion throughout
the application process; and (4) a party protesting the application may
defeat the change application by relying exclusively on circumstantial
evidence that demonstrates the probability of impairment).
Lawrence and Ann Searle purchased undeveloped property in
Sampete County, Utah. The building permit application process required the Searles to establish the presence of an on-site water source
sufficient to meet the needs of a prospective cabin. The Searles purchased a water right with a priority date of 1956, but with a diversion
point that was a significant distance from the cabin and therefore did
not satisfy the on-site requirement. The Searles subsequently sought to
change the water right's point of diversion and nature of use to a
closer existing well, known as the Jacobsen well. The Searles appropriately filed a change application with the Utah State Engineer ("State
Engineer") and advertised the application.
Milburn Irrigation Company ("Milburn") opposed the Searles'
change application. Milburn distributed water to its twenty-six shareholders by means of gravity-pressured sprinkler irrigation systems.
Milburn owned a water right with a priority date of 1876, entitling it to
divert 8.875 cubic feet of water per second from the South San Pitch
River; however, Milburn typically was not able to satisfy the entire
amount of its water right. It opposed Searle's application out of concern that the Jacobsen well was in the drainage area that contributed to
the South San Pitch and that the use of the well could lead to additional water shortfalls.
The State Engineer heard testimony from both parties concerning
the possibility of an impairment to Milburn's water right based on a
possible connection between the Jacobsen well and Milburn's water
source. The State Engineer consequently rejected the change application, and the Searles appealed to the Sixth District Court for the State
of Utah. The district court heard testimony from expert witnesses
from both parties and held that, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, approving the application would impair Milburn's
rights. The Searles then appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah.
On appeal, the Searles, Milburn, and the State Engineer each argued that the court should modify the approach taken by the district
court, raising three issues: (1) whether the district court properly in-
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voked the preponderance of evidence standard of proof; (2) whether
the district court correctly allocated the burden of persuasion; and (3)
whether a change application may be undermined by circumstantial
evidence demonstrating the probability of impairment. The court addressed each issue separately.
As a threshold issue, the court determined that district courts enjoy
significant, but not broad, discretion when determining whether evidence of impairment is sufficiently compelling to deny an application
approval. However, because of the strong public policy interest in
promoting consistent and predictable results when adjudicating water
rights, the court found it appropriate to constrain district court discretion in this area.
The parties presented two arguments regarding the appropriate
standard of proof. The State Engineer and Milburn argued that the
decision-maker should deny an application when a preponderance of
the evidence establishes that vested rights will be impaired, while the
Searles argued that the decision-maker should deny an application
only if direct, noncircumstantial evidence clearly demonstrates that
impairment would result from the approved application. The court
held that the proper standard lies between the two positions. advanced
by the parties: the change application process requires an applicant
only to show reason to believe that no impairment will result from application approval. The court reasoned that this standard of proof
provided a balance between twin policy goals: putting water to the
most beneficial use possible, and simultaneously guarding vested water
rights.
Next, the court addressed the proper burden of persuasion. The
district court shifted the burden of persuasion from the Searles to Milburn, based on a common misunderstanding of previous court opinions. Here the court emphasized that the burden of persuasion should
remain on change applicants throughout the application process. This
burden, the court reasoned, is analogous to the burden usually imposed upon the moving party in a lawsuit. Moreover, the applicant
must persuade the decision-maker that there is no reason to believe
that vested rights will be impaired if the application is approved. This
burden exists even when there is no opposition to the application, and
as a result unopposed applications can still fail.
Last, the court held that circumstantial evidence may be included
in the decision-making process. The court acknowledged that a protesting party faces a difficult task in producing evidence sufficient to
block approval, and that in many cases impairment only can be illustrated by relying on conjecture or probability.
The court remanded the case because the district court invoked the
wrong standard of proof and improperly allocated the burden of persuasion in its review of the State Engineer's decision.
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